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create obstructions interfering with the natural flow of surface water
onto his land, 22 and the lower lands are subject to the servitude of receiving the ordinary and natural flow of surface water.23 The upper
land owner's right is restricted, however, in that he cannot collect surface water and then release it in a huge volume; 24 nor can he make
excavations or drains upon his ground by which the flow of surface
water is diverted from its natural course and disposition
and thereby
25
cast upon the lower estate in an unnatural volume.
In conclusion nothing has been found in the Kentucky cases
dealing with percolating or surface water to suggest that our court
would hold that riparian rights exist in such water. In fact, the only
affirmative judicial statement on the point which the writer has been
able to find stated that riparian rights will not arise in surface water
unless it flows in a water course or stream, 26 and the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky has said that there are no riparian rights in percolating
water.27 Since the question of limiting the use of water in Kentucky
seems in the past to have depended on establishing riparian rights in
it, the logical conclusion is that one should be able to use all of his
percolating water and surface water. At least both kinds of water are
non riparian and both should be governed by the same rule as to use
of non riparian water for irrigation purposes.
GEORGE B. BAKER, JR.

TORT ACTIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
In the recent case of Brown v. Gosser1 the Kentucky Court of
Appeals was called upon to decide whether a wife during coverture
may continue an action commenced prior to marriage for a negligent
injury inflicted by her husband. The jury returned a verdict for the
' Dugan v. Long, 234 Ky. 511, 28 S.W. 2d. 765 (1930).
' Pickerill v. City of Louisville, 125 Ky. 213, 100 S.W. 873 (1907).
"Franz v. Jacobs, 183 Ky. 647, 210 S.W. 163 (1919).
Stone et ux. v. Ashurst et al., 285 Ky. 687, 149 S.W. 2d 4 (1941).
It should be noted that this statement is found in an intermediate court
opinion, and would not bind the court of last resort in this state. In the case of
Stith v. L. &N. R.R. Co., 109 Ky. 168, 58 S.W. 600 (1900) the Middlesborough
case was cited and overruled, but only to the extent that it held that the so called
"common law" rule applied in Kentucky. No mention was made of the further
holding that riparian rights will not arise in surface water unless it flows in a
water course or stream.
Supra note 10.
'262 S.W. 2d 480 (Ky. 1953).
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plaintiff and from the resulting judgment the defendant appealed.
The judgment was affirmed. 2
The weight of authority holds that neither spouse may sue the
other for a personal tort.3 However, a strong and rapidly growing
minority, with which Kentucky now has aligned itself, holds that since4
enactment of the married women's statutes such an action is possible.
The Kentucky court apparently did not believe that because the
tort in the principal case was committed and the action was com-

-The Kentucky Court of Appeals' last expression on this question was in
Broaddus v. Wilkinson, 281 Ky. 601, 186 S.W. 2d 1052 (1940) where the court
said, "Neither the husband nor the wife could sue the other in tort at common
law and this rule has not been abrogated."
'Cubbison v. Cubbison, 78 Cal. App. 2d 487, 166 P. 2d 387 (1946); Paulus
v. Bander, 73 Cal. App. 2d 437, 235 P. 2d 422 (1951); Corren v. Corren, 47 So.
2d 774 (Fla. 1950); Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E. 2d 152 (1952);
Blickenstaff v. Blickenstaff, 89 Ind. App. 529, 167 N.E. 146 (1929); In re
Dolmage's Estate, 203 Iowa 281, 212 N.W. 553 (1927); Main v. James Maine and
Sons Co., 198 Iowa 1278, 201 N.W. 20 (1924); Sink v. Sink, 172 Kan. 217, 239
P. 2d 933 (1952); McKenry v. American Employer's Ins. Co., 206 La. 70, 18 So.
2d 656 (1944) (Louisiana allows no recovery between spouses but one spouse
may recover from an insurance company); Callow v. Thomas, 322 Mass. 550, 78
N.E. 2d 637 (1948); Furstenburg v. Furstenburg, 152 Md. 247, 136 Ad. 534
(1927); see Anthony v. Anthony, 135 Me. 54, 188 AUt. 724, 725 (1937); Kircher
v. Kircher, 288 Mich. 669, 286 N.W. 120 (1939); Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427,
107 N.W. 1047 (1906), see American Auto Ins. Co. v. Molling, 57 N.W. 2d 847,
849 (Minn. 1953); Patenaude v. Patenaude, 195 Minn. 523, 263 N.W. 546
(1936); Scales v. Scales, 168 Miss. 439, 151 So. 551 (1934); Conley v. United
States Fidelity & G. Co., 98 Mont. 31, 37 P. 2d 565 (1934); Willot v. Willot, 333
Mo. 896, 62 S.W. 2d 1084 (1933); see Emerson v. Western In. Co., 116 Neb.
180, 216 N.W. 297 (1927); Wolfer v. Oehlers et al., 8 N. J. Super. 434, 73 A.
2d 95 (1950); Tanno v. Eby, 78 Ohio App. 21, 68 N.E. 2d 813 (1947); Ellis v.
Brenninger, 71 D. and C. 583, 66 Montg. 183 (Pa. 1950); Oken v. Oken, 44 R. I.
291, 117 AU. 357 (1922); Lillienkamp v. Rippetoe, 133 Tenn. 57, 179 S.W. 628
(1915); see Raines v. Mercer, 165 Tenn. 415, 55 S.W. 2d 263 (1932); Lunt v.
Lunt, 121 S.W. 2d 445 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); Cohen v. Cohen, 66 F. Supp. 312
(1947); Furey v. Furey, 193 Va. 727, 71 S.E. 2d 191 (1952); Comstock v. Comstock, 106 Vt. 50, 169 At. 903 (1934); Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wash. 496, 118
Pac. 629 (1911); Poling v. Poling, 116 W. Va. 187, 179 S.E. 604 (1935); Wright
v. Davis, 132 W. Va. 722, 53 S.E. 2d 385 (1949); McKinny v. McKinny, 59 Wyo.
204, 35 P. 2d 940 (1943); PnossER, ToRTs 901 (1941); MADDEN, Do~i~slc RELAT[0NS 223 (1931); McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43
HAnv. L. -REv. 1030, 1081 (1930); 3 VhmNIR, ANimlacAN FAMLY LAws 268
(1935).

'Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917); Bennett v. Bennett,
224 Ala. 335, 140 So. 378 (1932); Katzenberg v. Katzenberg, 183 Ark. 626, 37
S.W. 2d 696 (1931); Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 Atl. 889 (1914); Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 181 At. 432 (1925); Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19,
46 P. 2d 740 (1935); Steele v. Steele, 65 F. Supp. 329 (D. C. 1946); Lorang v.
Hayes, 69 Idaho 440, 209 P. 2d 733 (1949); Brandt v. Keller, 109 N.E. 2d 729
(Ill. 1953); Miltimore v. Milford Motor Co., 89 N. H. 272, 197 AU. 330 (1938);
Weidlick v. Weidlick, 30 N. Y. S. 2d 326, 177 Misc. 246 (1941); Jernigan v.
Jernigan, 236 N. C. 430, 72 S.E. 2d 912 (1952); Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 62
N. D. 191, 242 N.W. 526 (1932); Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 393, 87 P. 2d
660 (1939); Pardue v. Pardue, 167 S. C. 129, 166 S.E. 101 (1932); Scotvold v.
Scotvold, 68 S.D. 53, 298 N.W. 266 (1941); Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209
N.W. 475 (1926).
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menced prior to marriage the result should be different than if the tort
had occurred and the action had been commenced during coverture.
This seems correct in legal theory. At common law antenuptial torts
were extinguished by marriage and even if the action was commenced
prior to marriage it had to be dismissed or stayed.5 Since the statutes
do not make such a distinction, there is no basis for making one. It
should also be noted that most courts following the majority rule
have not thought the distinction to be important.6
Another distinction that might be made is one between negligent
and intentional torts. However the cases do not bear this out. A
typical reaction is found in the leading case of Courtney v. Courtney:
Nor can the difference in the nature of the torts be considered
seriously from a legal standpoint.... In the case of negligent tort,
the wife has suffered a wrong for which the law should provide a
There is no element
remedy, just as in the case of a wilful tort....
to distinguish one wrong from the other in the determination of
whether a remedy therefor should be allowed and we find that the
courts have made no valid distinction in such determination.7

Because at common law one spouse could not bring an action
against the other s the courts have necessarily relied upon statutes as
a basis for allowing the action. Hence the principal case is based
upon an interpretation of the Kentucky statute which reads: "A married woman may sue, and be sued, as a single woman." 9 The following
states which have similar statutes have accepted the minority rule:' 0
Arkansas," Colorado,' 9 New Hampshire,"3 North Carolina,' a and Wisconsin. 5 With the exception of the statute in New York,' 6 which expressly provides for the bringing of tort actions between spouses, the
41 C. J. S. 880 (1944).
PnossEa, TOTs 901, 902 (1941); MADDEN, DomssTIc RELATnONS 224
(1931)
'184 Okla. 395, 87 P. 2d 660, 661 (1939).
127 Am. Jun. 191 (1940); 41 C. J. S. 877 (1944).
1Ky. CODE, Cvm PRoc. ANN. see. 34 (1) (1948) (which with modification
appears in the new rules as: Ky. RuLEs, Crvm Pnoc. see. 17.02 (1953).
" But the statutory interpretations have been especially divergent, even to the
point that statutes of similar character have been interpreted differently. Compare
Fiedeer v. Fiedeer, 42 Okla. 124, 140 Pac. 1022 (1914) with Strom v. Strom, 98
Minn. 427, 107 N.W. 1047 (1906); or compare Fitzpatrick v. Ownes, 124 Ark.
167, 186 S.W. 832 (1916), with Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611 (1910).
For classifications of the statutes see 3 Vmauimz, AmucAr FA nLY LAws 255,
268 (1935), supplement at 95 (1938); Farage, Recovery For Torts Between
Spouses, 10 IND. L. J. 290, 296 (1935).
'Anu. STAT. ANN. sec. 55-401 (1947).
" COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 108, sec. 2 (1935).
II N. H. REv. STAT. c. 340, sec. 2 (1942).
112A N. C. GEN. STAT. A.. sec. 52-10 (1950).
'Wis. STAT. see. 246.07 (1951).
6

" N. Y. Dom.

REL. LAw,

sec. 57 (1950).
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development of the rule has come about as a result of change in
judicial attitude rather than by express legislative enactment.
Courts resisting the minority rule have used a multitude of reasons
for denying the action. Those most often advanced are:
1. If tort actions between spouses were allowed, the peace and
tranquility of the home would be destroyed. In the principal case
Judge Combs ably answers this:
The argument would have a truer ring except for the fact a wife may

now, in this state, sue her husband for tort affecting her property
interest.

For instance, she may now sue him for conversion, or

detention of chattels, for fraud, for trespass to land, for waste, or in
an action of ejectment or unlawful detainer. [citations omitted] It is
difficult to perceive how a tort action for personal injuries would
disrupt the domestic peace and tranquility to any greater extent than
a tort action for damage to property.' 7

Furthermore, if the tort consists of assault and battery little peace and
tranquility would seem to remain. And if one spouse has been negligently injured by the other, it is not a necessary conclusion that conjugal bliss will be broken by allowing the tort action in cases where
an insurance company will ultimately bear the loss. If there is any
danger here, it lies more in collusion between the spouses than in
disruption of the home. 18 One judge said, "We can conceive of circumstances where liability insurance carried by the husband might
prove the moving factor and not at all disrupt connubial bliss in collecting from an insurance company." 19
2. The husband and wife have long been regarded as a legal
entity. Although the statutes have apparently destroyed this conception, the historical influence continues. 20 In modem civilization where
women are managers of corporations, elected to Congress, appointed
ambassadors, and own a major portion of the nation's wealth, this
21
conception is not only obsolete, but impractical.
3. Some courts have met a stumbling block in statutory interpretation. Since at common law neither spouse was permitted a cause of
action against the other and the statutes are silent as to the husband's
rights, it is said the legislature could not have intended to give a
cause of action to the wife while leaving the husband in status quo.22
But the courts allowing the action state that the statutes have the
'7262 S.W. 2d 480 (Ky. 1953); PRosszm, TorTs 901, 903 (1941).
's PuossEn, TORTS 908 (1941).
"Harvey v. Harvey, 239 Mich. 142, 214 N.W. 305 (1927).

McCurdy, supra note 3, at 1035.
'Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P. 2d 740 (1935) passim; Wait v. Pierce
et al., 191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475, 477 (1926).

Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wash. 496, 118 Pac. 629, 630 (1911).
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effect of destroying the legal unity of the husband and wife. The wife
is then in a position of a feme sole or an unmarried person including
the right to sue or be sued for an injury to her person. 23 Contrariwise,
other courts argue that since at common law each spouse lacked both
a substantive and procedural right to sue the other, the removal of the
procedural incapacity by statute does not necessarily create a new substantive cause of action.24 Thus it is argued that the statute must expressly create such a cause of action. Although only one statute expressly creating the action has been found,25 fourteen states along
with the District of Columbia nevertheless allow such a cause of action.
One writer said:
It is not necessary to create a cause of action in terms, for the re-

moval of disability leaves the parties possessed of all rights and subject to all duties that pertain to an ordinary person. In this sense
the statute 'creates' a cause of action.'

And one court spoke thusly:
It was necessary [naming a section of the statute] only to free the
married woman of her procedural disability in order that she might
exercise the natural rights of an ordinary person which she had

gradually gained through a change in the conception of marriage....

And another court said:
As the nonliability of the husband to the wife for damages for a
personal tort was founded upon the common-law fiction that the husband and wife were one, it would seem to follow that where that
fiction is abolished, the nonliability does not survive.'

Hence it may be argued plausibly that if the wife is a person independent of the husband she has the same rights as all independent
natural persons, including the right to sue any person for an injury to
her person.
4. Occasionally the reason has been said to lie in the convenient
phrase, public policy. Although there was a time when this type of
action was opposed to public policy, the evolution of the status of
women has reached a point where this line of reasoning is questionable. One of the fundamental aims of the law should be to settle differences with practical remedies appropriate to the social system of
the times. When the reasons for a rule have been exploded and the
rule itself has outworn its usefulness, courts should not allow the compulsion of judicial inertia to cause them to dispense antique justice.
' Fitzpatrick v. Owens, 124 Ark. 167, 186 S.W. 832, 835 (1916).

' Keister's Adm'r v. Keister's Exrs, 123 Va. 157, 96 S.E. 315, 316 (1918).
'See note 16 supra.
' McCurdy, supra note 3, at 1051.
2d 660, 665 (1938).
' Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.742
(1935).
'Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P. 2d 740,
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5. It sometimes is said that a spouse has ample protection by
bringing a bill for divorce or by seeking criminal indictment. It is not
difficult to imagine the situation where a wife has been injured as a
result of her husband's negligent operation of an automobile and is
in dire need of compensation, yet she may have no desire to part
company with him by divorce or through his imprisonment. Furthermore where a wife is physically injured and her earning capacity is
impaired, her financial situation will not be bettered by having her
husband placed behind bars. Should a husband or wife therefore be
forced to criminal proceedings with their attendant stigma or should
persons who will not seek a divorce or those who are unable to obtain
a divorce be denied an adequate remedy?
Where tort actions between husband and wife are permitted, a
large percentage of the litigation has been in the field of negligent
rather than intentional torts. Where the negligence resulted from the
use of an automobile, public attention has been focused upon a practical consideration underlying the legal problems. There is almost
universal use of automobile liability insurance today. Even though the
insurance company may not be allowed to be a party to the action,
it is the real party who stands to lose. Conceding that this fact should
not in legal theory affect the question of tort suits between spouses,
one cannot overlook the consternation which developed in the background as a result of allowing such an action. Insurance companies
were quick to point out that allowing such suits would inevitably
raise premium rates. Thus realistically viewed, there seem to be two
chief factors which should be weighed in considering the allowance
of tort actions between spouses: (1) the seriousness of the burden
which will fall upon liability insurance companies which insure the
husband or wife; and (2) the desirability of such suits. Since insurance companies have the facilities to change their rates or rephrase their contracts in order to prevent any ruinous loss from payments to injured spouses, the burden upon insurance companies
should not be overwhelming. In Courtney v. Courtney, it is stated:
A man pays for insurance to indemnify any person whom he injures
by his careless driving, and if it is intended to except his wife from
such indemnification, such intent can very easily be expressed in the
contract...

The opportunity for collusion between spouses is a factor which cannot be overlooked, but courts have accepted the responsibility of
ferreting out fabrications in other situations; as for example, in suits
for divorce or alienation of affections. Nor is the danger of fraud any
' 184 Okla. 395, 87 P. 2d 660, 668 (1938).
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greater than in actions brought by an automobile passenger against
These cases
his host for injuries caused by his host's negligence.
30
should not be "saddled with a presumption of fraud."
As to the desirability factor, it is submitted that an injury resulting
from the tortious act of a spouse should be no less compensable than
an act of a stranger. One cannot reasonably assume that a husband is
more willing to recompense the general public than his wife, nor is
an injured spouse any less injured because she is married. Where an
action is denied, she may be without an adequate remedy. It is difficult for courts to continue to argue that denying such an action will
contribute to the preservation of domestic happiness in the intentional
tort cases where the greatest damage has already occurred and in the
automobile negligence cases where the insurance company will indemnify the losing spouse. For those who fear that once the door is
opened a volume of trivial suits will arise, it is suggested that the defenses of consent and assumption of risk are applicable to this situation.
The reasons most often advanced for denying a husband or wife

such an action are no longer compelling. In addition, denying the
right of action may place a heavy burden on the injured spouse.
Therefore the decision of the Kentucky court seems a step in the right
direction.
WuLL Im

J. BrCes

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-EFFECT OF
TRANSFER OF BUSINESS WITHOUT NOTICE
Transfer of business without notice to the employee as affecting
the employee's right to recover against the original employer and his
insurer for injuries sustained after the transfer was the subject of an
unusual legal determination which was given judicial reaffirmance
recently by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in two similar workmen's compensation cases, Hamlin v. Sammons," and Bituminous Gas

Corp. v. Johnson.2 In each case the plaintiff was hired as a mine
worker of employer-one who carried workmen's compensation insurance. Employer-one then transferred the mining operations to em10Ibid.
I261 S.W. 2d 440 (Ky. 1953).
2259 S.W. 2d 448 (Ky. 1953).

